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t.zuradzki@uj.edu.pl				 In	my	paper	I	analyze	recent	discussions	about	making	moral	decisions	under	normative	uncertainty.	I	discuss	whether	this	kind	 of	 uncertainty	 should	 have	 practical	 consequences	 for	decisions	and	whether	there	are	reliable	methods	of	reasoning	that	 deal	with	 the	 possibility	 that	we	 are	wrong	 about	 some	moral	 issues.	 I	 defend	 a	 limited	 use	 of	 the	 decision	 theory	model	of	reasoning	in	cases	of	normative	uncertainty.		 KEYWORDS:	 bioethics,	 decision	 theory,	 metaethics,	 moral	uncertainty,	the	ethics	of	war			1.	INTRODUCTION			The	 simple	 fact	 is	 that	 even	 when	 we	 feel	 quite	 certain	 about	 moral	issues,	we	 are	 susceptible	 to	mistakes.	 For	 example,	we	have	 to	 act	 in	the	 face	 of	 uncertainty	 about	 the	 facts,	 the	 consequences	 of	 our	decisions,	 the	 identity	 of	 people	 involved,	 people’s	 preferences,	moral	doctrines,	 specific	 moral	 duties,	 or	 the	 ontological	 status	 of	 some	entities	 (belonging	 to	 some	 ontological	 class	 usually	 has	 serious	implications	for	moral	status).	I	want	to	analyze	whether	these	kinds	of	uncertainties	 should	 have	 practical	 consequences	 for	 actions	 and	whether	 there	 are	 reliable	 methods	 of	 reasoning	 that	 deal	 with	 the	possibility	that	we	understand	some	crucial	moral	issues	wrong.		The	most	 promising	 approach	 is	 to	 try	 to	 extend	 the	 decision	theory	 model	 of	 reasoning	 to	 encompass	 normative	 uncertainty	(Lockhart,	 2000).	 But	 this	 model,	 when	 used	 to	 guide	 our	 action	 in	moral	 terms,	 is	 highly	 controversial.	 It	 assumes	 that	 in	 the	 face	 of	normative	risk	or	uncertainty	we	are	rational	if	and	only	if	we	maximize	expected	value	(whatever	it	is).	In	this	case	two	things	would	determine	what	we	ought	to	do	under	normative	uncertainty:	1)	the	probabilities	
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1094	assigned	 to	 the	 various	 normative	 views;	 2)	 the	 differences	 in	 values	between	 the	 available	 actions,	 according	 to	 each	 of	 those	 views.	 This	approach	 –	 if	 successful	 –	 would	 have	 some	 interesting	 applications	both	in	metaethics	(e.g.	rejecting	nihilism,	see:	Ross,	2006)	and	applied	ethics	 in	particular	 the	ethics	of	war	and	bioethics	 (permissible	killing	people	 or	 animals,	 abortion,	 embryo	 research,	 see:	 Guerrero,	 2007;	Moller,	2011;	Friberg-Fernros,	2014;	Żuradzki,	2012,	2014).	Moreover,	the	 argument	 (from	 moral	 or	 normative	 uncertainty)	 is	 also	 used	 in	other	contexts	(Henning,	2015).		The	main	problem	that	the	supporters	of	this	approach	have	to	deal	 with	 is	 the	 question	 of	 intertheoretic	 comparisons	 of	 value.	Normally,	when	we	use	expected	utility	calculus	we	use	a	common	scale	by	 which	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 measure	 the	 values	 attached	 to	 different	outcomes	 (this	 is	 one	 reason	why	 so	many	 examples	 refer	 to	money).	But	 there	 doesn’t	 seem	 to	 be	 any	 way	 of	 making	 this	 kind	 of	intertheoretic	comparison	of	moral	values	between	different	theories	or	doctrines.	 Moreover,	 recently	 a	 few	 philosophers	 presented	 other	arguments	against	the	attempts	to	extend	expected	value	maximization	style	 reasoning	 to	 encompass	 moral	 uncertainty	 (MacAskill,	 2013;	Weatherson,	 2014;	 Harman,	 2015;	 Nissan-Rozen,	 2015,	 Hedden,	forthcoming).		2.	MANY	FACES	OF	UNCERTAINTY		There	are	many	ways	in	which	you	can	be	uncertain	about	the	morally	important	aspects	of	your	action.	For	example,	you	could	be	certain	that	some	 action	 can	 harm	 some	 people	 (or	 other	 beings	 with	 the	 moral	significance),	but	uncertain	about	the	identity	and	the	number	of	people	involved.		A	combatant	who	fires	 indiscriminately	 from	his	gun	at	a	place	inhabited	by	noncombatants	is	in	this	position.	He	knows	that	there	is	a	serious	 risk	 that	 some	 innocent	 people	 could	 be	 fatally	 shot,	 but	 he	knows	 neither	 their	 identity	 nor	 number.	 Alternatively,	 you	 can	 know	that	there	is	a	serious	risk	that	some	action	will	harm	a	person	and	you	can	know	who	is	this	person.	Someone	who	plays	Russian	roulette	with	a	prisoner	of	war	is	in	this	position.		Finally,	 you	 can	 be	 sure	 that	 some	 action	 will	 harm	 some	identified	beings,	but	not	sure	about	its	ontological	or	moral	status.	The	real-life	 examples	of	beings	with	uncertain	ontological	or	moral	 status	(at	 least	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 some	 people)	 include	 fetus,	 human	embryos	(in	particular	at	the	very	early	stages	of	development)	or	some	products	 (real	 or	 only	 possible)	 of	 genetic	 engineering.	 Some	philosophers	 have	 also	 argued	 that	 it	 is	 the	 case	 of	 at	 least	 some	
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animals.	Analogically	to	the	two	above	examples,	one	could	be	tempted	to	say	that	someone	who	aborts	fetus,	destroys	human	embryos	(during	in	vitro	procedures	or	during	scientific	research)	or	kills	animal	 is	 in	a	similar	position	as	soldiers	from	the	two	above	examples.	In	 all	 these	 cases	 there	 is	 a	 risk	 that	 something	 that	has	moral	status	will	 be	 harmed.	 So	 the	 popular	 argument	 says	 that	 in	 all	 these	three	 cases	 there	 are	 strong	 reasons	 for	 agents	 not	 to	 act:	 not	 fire	indiscriminately	at	area	 inhabited	by	noncombatants,	not	play	Russian	roulette	with	a	prisoner	of	war,	not	harm	human	embryos	or	 animals.	And	this	popular	argument	adds	that	it	is	also	a	reason	to	condemn	such	actions	 no	 matter	 what	 their	 results	 are.	 It	 is	 wrong	 –	 says	 this	argument	–	to	impose	a	risk	to	someone	who	is	not	liable	to	be	exposed,	even	 if	 a	 potential	 victim	 is	 actually	 not	 harmed	 (review	 article	 about	the	 problem	 of	 risk	 imposition:	 Hayenhjelm	 &	 Wolff,	 2012).	 This	argument	–	presented	very	often	by	Catholic	preachers	or	scholars	(but	also,	 surprisingly,	 by	 defenders	 of	 animals	 rights)	 –	 treats	 all	 three	above	 cases	 in	 a	 very	 similar	 way	 and	 is	 used	 to	 argue	 against	 the	permissibility	of	abortion	or	destruction	of	early	human	embryos.	 It	 is	usually	presented	in	a	form	an	analogy	to	hunting:			
Example	1:	Deer	hunting	If	 I	 am	hunting	with	a	 rifle,	 and	 I	 see	 something	move	 in	 the	trees	 but	 am	 unsure	 whether	 it	 is	 a	 deer	 or	 a	 person,	 I	 am	obliged	 not	 to	 shoot	 until	 I	 establish	 that	 it	 is	 in	 fact	 a	 deer:	better	safe	than	sorry	(Shaw,	2008,	p.	219).		Catholic	 preachers	 or	 scholars	 (and	 vegetarians)	 argue	 that	 when	someone	is	unsure	whether	some	being	has	a	full	moral	status	or	not,	he	should	 be	 obliged	 not	 to	 kill	 it.	 Since	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 resolve	empirically	whether	 or	 not	 the	 target	 has	 full	moral	 status,	 obligation	not	 to	kill	 is	not	 time-limited.	According	 to	 this	view	(see	 for	example:	Friberg-Fernros,	 2014)	 the	 same	 argument	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 human	embryos	 (in	 particular	 in	 early	 stages):	 since	 there	 are	 reasonable	doubts	 about	 their	 personal	 status,	 morality	 requires	 that	 human	embryos	from	conception	be	treated	as	persons.		3.	FACTUAL	UNCERTAINTY	AND	THE	ETHICS	OF	WAR		In	 this	 chapter	 I	 will	 use	 some	 examples	 from	 the	 ethics	 of	 war	 to	demonstrate	 the	 difference	 between	 cases	 of	 factual	 and	 normative	uncertainty.	In	a	war	context	the	question	of	risk	imposition	is	discussed	usually	in	this	kind	of	context:			
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Example	2:	A	security	checkpoint	Imagine	that	you	are	a	soldier,	ordered	to	protect	a	military	or	diplomatic	 convoy	 as	 it	 passes	 through	 hostile	 territory,	 and	you	 see	 a	 car	 stopped	 by	 the	 side	 of	 the	 road	 ahead.	 Or	imagine	that	you	are	stationed	at	a	security	checkpoint	and	a	car	approaches	despite	signs	and	warnings	directing	it	to	stop.	The	occupants	of	the	car	may	be	civilians,	but	they	also	may	be	irregular	forces	waiting	to	attack	(Haque,	2014,	p.	65).			So	 the	 question	 in	 this	 case	 is	 how	 certain	 should	 be	 a	 soldier	 that	people	 at	 the	 front	 of	 him	 are	 combatant,	 rather	 than	noncombatants,	before	 using	 deadly	 force?	 Surely,	 soldiers	 are	 in	 a	 different	 position	than	hunters,	because	the	stake	is	much	bigger:	they	risk	their	lives	and	they	risk	the	case	for	which	they	fight.	 In	a	hunter	case	there	 is	hardly	anything	valuable	in	killing	a	deer	(except	from	hunter’s	pleasure,	since	I	assume	that	it	is	not	necessary	hunting).	In	this	sense	a	soldier’s	case	is	more	similar	to	some	cases	of	abortion	or	embryo	research,	where	the	stake	 also	 can	 be	 quite	 high	 (the	 well-being	 or	 health	 of	 woman;	development	of	science	during	embryo	research).		The	 obligation	 not	 to	 kill	 civilians	 is	 well-established	 in	international	 law	 and	 international	 theory.	 For	 example	 Protocol	Additional	to	the	Geneva	Conventions	says:			 In	 order	 to	 ensure	 respect	 for	 and	 protection	 of	 the	 civilian	population	and	civilian	objects,	the	Parties	to	the	conflict	shall	at	 all	 times	 distinguish	 between	 the	 civilian	 population	 and	combatants	 and	 between	 civilian	 objects	 and	 military	objectives	 and	 accordingly	 shall	 direct	 their	 operations	 only	against	military	objectives	(Protocol,	1977,	art.	48).			So	firstly,	all	participants	in	conflicts	must	determine	whether	an	aim	is	legitimate	 or	 illegitimate	 target:	 they	 must	 distinguish	 between	combatants	 and	 noncombatants	 (I	 will	 assume	 that	 combatants	 are	people	 who	 are	 directly	 involved	 in	 hostilities,	 some	 of	 them	 can	 be	civilians).	And	secondly,	 it	 is	permissible	to	target	only	combatants	(or	other	military	objectives).	Of	course	this	description	is	highly	idealized,	and	 I	we	 have	 seen	 in	A	 security	 checkpoint	 case	 very	 often	 it	 unclear	whether	 the	 target	 of	 operation	 are	 combatants	 or	 not.	 Surprisingly,	international	 law	 proposes	 a	 very	 similar	 rule	 to	 this	 one	 that	 was	proposed	in	Deer	hunting	case:			
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In	 case	 of	 doubt	 whether	 a	 person	 is	 a	 civilian,	 that	 person	shall	be	considered	to	be	a	civilian	(Protocol,	1977,	supra	note	9).			 Those	 who	 plan	 or	 decide	 upon	 an	 attack	 shall	 (…)	 do	everything	feasible	to	verify	that	the	objectives	to	be	attacked	are	neither	civilians	nor	civilian	objects	and	are	not	subject	to	special	protection	but	are	military	objectives	(Protocol,	1977,	supra	note	5).			This	 point	 of	 the	 Protocol	 does	 not	 specify	 any	 the	 level	 of	 care	with	which	 a	 soldier	 must	 try	 to	 distinguish	 combatants	 from	noncombatants.	 Neither	 this	 point	 specify	 how	much	 effort	 should	 be	put	 in	 verifying	 (soldiers	 should	 only	 do	 “everything	 feasible”).	 In	 its	literal	 interpretations	 it	 means	 that	 if	 there	 is	 any	 doubt	 about	 the	nature	of	a	target	proceeding	is	prohibited.	It	would	mean	for	example	that	in	cases	like	A	security	checkpoint	when	there	is	any	doubt	whether	in	 an	 approaching	 car	 are	 noncombatants,	 soldiers	 are	 not	 allowed	 to	use	deadly	force.		In	many	conflict	situation	this	level	of	civilian	protection	would	be	 too	 restrictive	 and	 some	 Western	 countries	 entered	 reservation	about	 this	provision	(for	example	 the	UK	states	 that	 it	 “applies	only	 in	cases	 of	 substantial	 doubt”	 -	 Declaration	 2002).	 Haque	 noticed	 that	despite	 literate	 meaning	 of	 this	 regulation	 in	 the	 literature	 or	commentaries	 the	 most	 common	 approach	 to	 this	 problem	 is	 the	balancing	 approach	 according	 to	 which	 “both	 the	 required	 level	 of	certainty	and	the	required	level	of	risk	vary	with	the	balance	of	military	and	humanitarian	considerations”	 (Haque,	2012,	p.	63).	This	approach	is	 visible	 in	 Walzer’s	 Just	 and	 Unjust	 Wars	 when	 he	 writes	 about	combatants’	obligations:			 The	 degree	 of	 risk	 that	 is	 permissible	 is	 going	 to	 vary	 with	nature	of	the	target,	the	urgency	of	the	moment,	the	available	technology,	and	so	on	(Walzer,	2000,	p.	156).			It	 is	 also	 proposed	 by	 commentators	 who	 underline	 that	 combatants	should	“balance”	possible	benefits	and	risk	to	civilians:			 The	 reasonable	 care	 rule	 is	 disquieting.	 It	 vests	 belligerents	with	 considerable	 discretion	 in	 multifaceted	 balancing	 and	legitimizes	even	 large-scale	 injury	to	 innocent	civilians	under	certain	circumstances	(Waxman,	2012,	p.	1393).			
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1098	So	the	most	common	approach	among	scholars	is	quite	contradictory	to	the	 literal	meaning	 of	 the	 Protocol:	 now	one	 expects	 that	 soldiers	 can	act	only	if	he	is	100	percent	certain	in	all	cases.	In	some	circumstances	solders	can	attack	even	in	the	face	of	substantial	doubts	about	the	status	of	 target	 (when	 the	 military	 stakes	 are	 very	 high),	 and	 in	 some	circumstances	soldiers	must	abstain	from	attack	in	the	face	of	even	very	slight	doubts.		It	 can	 be	 visible	 in	 the	 next	 hypothetical	 example,	 which	 is	slightly	modified	version	of	the	Example	no.	1	A	security	checkpoint:			
Example	3:	A	security	checkpoint	(modified)	Imagine	that	you	are	a	soldier,	ordered	to	protect	a	military	or	diplomatic	convoy	[consisting	of:	a)	5	people;	b)	20	people]	as	it	passes	 through	hostile	 territory,	and	you	see	a	car	stopped	by	 the	 side	 of	 the	 road	 ahead.	 Or	 imagine	 that	 you	 are	stationed	at	a	security	checkpoint	[consisting	of:	a)	5	soldiers;	b)	 20	 soldiers]	 and	 a	 car	 approaches	 despite	 signs	 and	warnings	directing	it	to	stop.	The	occupants	of	the	car	may	be	civilians,	 but	 they	 also	 may	 be	 irregular	 forces	 waiting	 to	attack.			In	this	case	we	modified	number	of	solders	endangered:	in	the	a)	cases	there	 are	 only	 5	 endangered	 soldiers,	 in	 the	 b)	 cases	 there	 20	endangered	 soldiers.	 I	 assume	 that	 if	 the	 occupants	 of	 the	 car	 are	irregular	 forces	 they	 will	 want	 to	 kill	 all	 soldiers.	 According	 to	 the	balancing	approach	the	way	in	which	soldiers	should	precede	depends	on	the	number	of	solders	endangered:	they	are	permissible	to	act	even	if	they	 have	more	 serious	 doubts	 in	 the	 b-type	 cases	 than	 in	 the	 a-type	cases.	 There	are	serious	objections	to	the	balancing	approach	in	case	of	the	 ethics	 of	war	 (Haque,	 2012),	 but	 I	 am	not	 going	 to	 evaluate	 them.	Instead,	 I	want	 to	demonstrate	 that	 this	 kind	of	 balancing	 approach	 is	even	more	difficult	to	use	in	the	cases	of	moral	uncertainty.			4.	MORAL	UNCERTAINTY	AND	BALANCING	APPROACH		Let	me	start	this	part	with	a	typical	example	discussed	in	the	literature.			
Example	4:	Meat	eating		Suppose,	for	example,	that	an	agent	is	uncertain	between	two	views	 about	 the	morality	 of	 eating	meat.	 In	 one	 view,	 eating	meat	 is	 tantamount	 to	murder;	 it	 is	much,	much	worse,	 then,	to	eat	meat	than	to	abstain	from	it.	In	another	view,	it	 is	ever	so	slightly	better	to	eat	meat	than	to	abstain	–	better,	perhaps,	
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for	reasons	of	health	or	pleasure.	 In	the	most	plausible	views	of	 rationality	 under	moral	 uncertainty,	 it	 is	 rational	 to	 avoid	eating	meat,	even	 if	one’s	belief	 in	the	second	view	is	slightly	higher	(Sepielli,	2013,	p.	581).			At	first	sight	it	seems	that	this	example	is	very	similar	to	the	case	of	Deer	
hunting:	on	the	one	hand	we	can	act	in	a	risky	way	–	we	can	have	a	small	benefit	 (a	 deer	 is	 ours;	 we	 eat	 a	 nice	 meal),	 but	 there	 is	 a	 serious	possibility	that	we	do	something	very	wrong:	we	kill	a	person;	or	we	kill	a	being	that	have	full	moral	status	–	the	same	or	almost	the	same	as	an	adult	person.	 So	 it	may	seem	 that	 rationality	 requires	 to	do	 the	action	with	 “the	 highest	 expected	 moral	 value”.	 What	 does	 it	 mean?	 “An	action’s	 expected	 moral	 value	 is	 the	 probability-weighted	 sum	 of	 its	moral	values	according	to	the	various	moral	views	or	theories”	(Sepielli,	2013,	p.	581).	Moreover,	 it	 seems	 that	any	plausible	 theory	of	 rational	decision	 making	 under	 uncertainty	 will	 care	 about	 moral	 stakes	 of	decisions	according	to	different	moral	theories.	So,	below	I	demonstrate	that	 the	 expected	 moral	 value	 solution	 is	 only	 one	 of	 many	 possible	solutions	that	were	proposed	recently.	It	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 other	 examples	 related	 with	 decision-making	under	normative	uncertainty	(abortion,	destroying	early	human	embryos)	 are	 more	 complicated	 than	 meat	 eating	 because	 there	 are	important	values	not	on	one	side,	but	on	both	(so	they	are	more	similar	to	 the	 security	 checkpoint	 cases).	 Abortions	 are	 usually	 defended	because	 of	 some	 important	 values	 at	 stake	 (well-being	 or	 health	 of	 a	woman,	 the	 low	 quality	 of	 life	 of	 possible	 child).	 The	 same	 is	 with	destroying	 of	 early	 human	 embryos	 either	 because	 of	 reproductive	purpose	 (in	vitro	 fertilization)	or	because	of	 scientific	 research.	Below	we	will	see	the	importance	of	this	difference.		
4.1	My	Favorite	Theory	and	its	problems			Probably	 the	 most	 obvious	 proposition	 how	 to	 act	 under	 normative	uncertainty	 is	 My	 Favorite	 Theory	 approach.	 It	 says	 that	 “a	 morally	conscientious	 agent	 chooses	 an	 option	 that	 is	 permitted	 by	 the	 most	credible	moral	 theory”	 (Gustafsson	&	 Torpman,	 2014,	 p.	 159).	 Even	 if	you	 have	 doubts	 about	meat	 eating,	 you	 are	 permitted	 to	 eat	 it	 if	 you	believe	that	theory	according	to	which	animals	have	not	any	important	moral	status	is	more	reliable	than	any	other	theory	about	animal	status.	Although	 this	 approach	 looks	 very	 intuitive,	 there	 are	interesting	 counter-examples.	 Consider	 the	 following	 case	 (adopted	from	 (Gustafsson	 &	 Torpman,	 2014)	 in	 which	 you	 can	 either	 choose	action	A	or	action	B,	and	your	credences	are	divided	between	two	moral	
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1100	doctrines	MD1	 and	MD2.	 You	 think	 that	MD1	 is	 slightly	more	 reliable	than	MD2	(I	introduce	some	numbers	for	convenience,	for	example	that	your	 credence	 in	MD1	 is	 0,6	 and	 your	 credence	 in	MD2	 is	 0,4,	 but	 of	course	in	real	life	this	kind	of	precision	is	not	necessary).			 	 A	 B	MD1	(0,6)	 Slightly	wrong	 Merely	OK	MD2	(0,4)	 Saintly	 Morally	terrible	Table	1		The	 descriptions	 of	 the	 results	 show	 the	moral	 evaluation	 of	 possible	outcomes	 (wrong,	 merely	 OK…).	 In	 this	 kind	 of	 cases	 it	 seems	 that	despite	the	fact	that	an	agent	thinks	that	the	moral	theory	MD1	is	more	reliable	than	MD2,	she	should	act	as	if	the	theory	MD2	were	correct	or	right	moral	doctrine.	It	would	mean	that	she	should	prefer	action	A	over	action	B	–	against	My	Favorite	Theory.	Why?	Because	–	analogically	 to	our	previous	case	of	Meat	eating	–	an	agent	may	prefer	not	risking	any	serious	 moral	 wrongdoing.	 If	 she	 decided	 on	 B,	 which	 seems	 OK	according	to	the	MD1,	the	favorite	theory	for	an	agent,	she	risk	a	serious	wrongdoing	if	she	were	not	right	about	moral	theories	and	in	fact	MD2	were	the	right	doctrine.		As	 in	 our	 previous	 cases	 related	 to	 the	 ethics	 of	war,	 this	 case	also	 assumes	 the	 balancing	 account:	 the	 possibility	 of	 making	comparisons	 and	 weighing	 different	 values	 on	 one	 scale.	 In	 recent	literature	there	are	two	approaches	to	this	problem:	non-comparativism	and	comparativism.		This	 first	position	(Sepielli,	2013;	Nissan-Rizan,	2014)	assumes	that	 there	 is	 no	 analogy	 between	 factual	 and	 normative	 uncertainties	and	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 make	 intertheoretic	 comparisons	 of	 values.	 It	means	 that	 tables	 like	 Table	 1	 have	 no	 sense,	 because	 the	 moral	evaluation	 of	 results	 (wrong,	 merely	 OK…)	 is	 different	 for	 MD1	 and	MD2.	So	it	is	meaningless	to	say	that	rationality	requires	that	we	avoid	doing	something	morally	terrible	(according	to	MD1),	since	there	is	no	common	“currency”	for	both	moral	theories.	This	common	currency	is	a	necessary	requirement		In	the	previous	cases	related	to	the	ethics	of	war	we	compared	the	 values	 of	 soldiers’	 lives,	 the	 importance	 of	military	 target,	 and	 the	value	 of	 noncombatants	 lives.	 Even	 if	 it	 is	 very	 hard	 to	 compare	 how	much	 value	 “one	 civilian”	 versus	 some	 military	 target,	 the	 balancing	account	 tries	 to	 do	 it.	 In	 cases	 of	 normative	 uncertainty	 this	 kind	 of	comparisons	are	even	harder:	it	seems	that	there	is	no	way	for	making	
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this	 kind	 of	 intertheoretic	 comparisons	 of	 moral	 values	 between	different	theories	or	doctrines.		
4.2	Expected	value	approach	and	dominance	principle			Comparativism	in	its	strong	form	(Lockhart,	2000;	Sepielli,	2009)	is	now	an	 unpopular	 position.	 The	 main	 assumption	 of	 this	 view	 was	 to	calculate	 the	expected	moral	values	of	 the	available	actions,	relative	 to	possible	 axiologies,	 and	 summing	 up	 those	 expected	 moral	 values,	weighted	 by	 the	 degree	 of	 belief	 that	 the	 corresponding	 axiology	 is	correct.	There	were	two	main	propositions	how	to	do	it:	the	principle	of	equity	 among	 moral	 theories	 (Lockhart,	 2000),	 the	 reactive-attitude	approach	(Sepielli,	2009).	Both	of	them	seem	to	be	obviously	mistaken	(Sepielli,	2013).	Comparativism	 in	 its	 weak	 form	 seems	 to	 be	 much	 better	proposition.	 It	 has	 weak	 form	 because	 it	 does	 not	 require	 any	calculation	 of	 expected	moral	 values	 of	 all	 available	 actions.	 It	 means	that	 it	can	be	applied	only	 to	very	specific	kinds	of	situations	 in	which	an	 agent’s	 credences	 are	 not	 divided	 between	 two	 different	 moral	doctrines,	but	between	only	one	moral	doctrine	and	some	doctrine	(or	doctrines)	that	does	not	give	any	moral	reasons.	Its	conclusion	says	that	if	some	theories	in	which	you	have	credence	give	you	subjective	reason	to	 choose	 action	 A	 over	 action	 B,	 and	 no	 theories	 in	 which	 you	 have	credence	 give	 you	 subjective	 reason	 to	 choose	 action	B	 over	 action	A,	then	you	should	 (because	of	 the	 requirements	of	 rationality)	 choose	A	over	B	(Ross,	2006).		Let	 me	 introduce	 another	 example	 in	 which	 this	 type	 of	reasoning	should	work	perfectly	well	 (this	 is	a	modified	version	of	 the	example	discussed	by	Ross,	2006).	Suppose,	for	example,	that	John	must	decide	 whether	 to	 kill	 some	 being	 (that	 could	 have	 important	 moral	status)	or	not.	An	agent	strongly	believes	(it	is	doctrine	no.	1	–	D1)	that	it	is	highly	probable	that	from	the	moral	point	of	view	it	does	not	matter	if	he	kills	this	type	of	being	or	not,	but	he	is	not	absolutely	certain	of	his	normative	 views.	 Let	 me	 assume	 that	 his	 degree	 of	 credence	 is	 0.99.	This	means	that	he	thinks	that	there	is	a	very	small	chance	that	another	doctrine	is	the	right	one	(D2).	According	to	this	second	doctrine	killing	this	kind	of	organism	is	in	fact	morally	terrible	(his	degree	of	credence	regarding	this	view	is	0.01).			 	 A	 B	D1	(0,99)	 Does	not	matter	 Does	not	matter	D2	(0,01)	 Morally	right		 Morally	terrible	Table	2	
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1102		Accepting	 My	 Favorite	 Theory	 approach	 it	 does	 not	 matter	 what	 we	choose	because	according	to	our	favorite	theory	there	are	no	reasons	in	favor	 or	 against	 both	 possible	 options.	 In	 this	 case	 we	 could	 –	 for	example	–	decide	by	flipping	a	coin.	But	an	agent	accepts	doctrine	that	says	 that	 there	 is	 very	 small	 chance	 (0,01)	 that	 it	 would	 be	 morally	terrible	to	kill	this	type	of	organism	and	morally	right	not	to	kill	it.	If	an	agent	wants	 to	maximize	 the	expected	moral	value	of	his	decisions,	he	should	 choose	 A,	 even	 though	 he	 believes	 that	 the	 probability	 that	killing	this	type	of	being	is	morally	wrong	is	indeed	extremely	low.		Why	 this	 case	 is	 different	 than	 described	 in	 the	 Table	 1?	 The	application	of	expected	moral	value	approach	 in	 this	 type	of	reasoning	seems	 to	 be	 correct,	 because	 here	 there	 is	 no	 problem	 with	intertheoretic	 comparisons	 of	 values.	 An	 agent	 does	 not	 have	 to	compare	 in	 this	 situation	 any	 values	 or	 disvalues	 between	 different	moral	 doctrines	 or	 views	 on	 the	moral	 status	 of	 this	 living	 organism,	since	 one	 of	 views	 says	 that	 everything	 he	 does	 in	 the	 situation	 is	morally	neutral.	So	it	seems	that	in	these	types	of	cases,	the	ANU	would	indeed	 give	 a	 reason	 to	 prefer	 the	 safer	 option,	 only	 if	 the	 probability	that	this	option	is	morally	correct	is	greater	than	zero.				5.	CONCLUSION		In	this	paper	I	sketched	the	problem	of	meta-reasoning	in	making	moral	decisions	under	normative	uncertainty.	I	found	that	there	is	a	promising	type	of	meta-reasoning	proposed	by	Ross	(2006)	that	could	be	applied	to	some	cases	of	normative	uncertainty.	However,	it	is	worth	noting	that	this	kind	of	meta-reasoning	has	been	recently	extensively	criticized.	 In	this	 paper	 –	 because	 the	 lack	 of	 space	 –	 I	 have	 not	 considered	 some	important	arguments	against	meta-reasoning.	In	recent	literature	there	are	 at	 least	 five	 such	 critiques.	 The	 first	 refers	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 “the	infectiousness	of	nihilism”	(MacAskill,	2013).	This	argument	says	that	if	we	have	nonzero	 credence	 in	nihilism	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	use	expected	value	 reasoning	 (also	 in	 this	 weak	 sense	 of	 comparativism)	 in	 the	situations	 of	 normative	 uncertainty,	 because	 the	 expected	 value	 of	 all	options	 is	 undefined.	 The	 second	 refers	 to	 the	 problem	 with	accessibility.	 Even	 if	 descriptive	 facts	 may	 often	 be	 inaccessible	 to	agents,	we	could	assume	that	normative	facts	are	a	priori,	then	there	is	a	sense	 in	 which	 any	 agent	 is	 in	 a	 position	 to	 know	 the	 moral	 truth	(Hedden,	forthcoming).	In	this	case	there	would	be	no	such	situations	as	normative	 uncertainty.	 Thirdly,	 some	 authors	 say	 that	 although	 non-culpable	 factual	 ignorance	 is	 an	excusing	 factor,	 it	 is	not	 the	 case	with	normative	 ignorance	 which	 does	 not	 exculpate	 (Harman,	 2014).	 The	
Meta-reasoning	in	making	moral	decisions	 1103	conclusion	would	be	similar	to	the	first	critique:	there	is	no	such	state	as	normative	 uncertainty.	 Fourthly,	 there	 is	 an	 argument	 from	 action-guiding	and	 fetishism	argument.	 It	 says	 that	morally	 good	people	 care	non-derivatively	about	other	people,	their	well-being	and	the	like.	Meta-reasoning	would	 force	 agents	 to	 care	 not	 about	 people	 but	 about	 one	thing:	 doing	what	 they	believe	 to	 be	 right,	where	 this	 is	 read	de	dicto	and	not	de	re	(Weatherson,	2014).	 If	 this	critique	 is	right	probably	the	best	theory	under	normative	uncertainty	would	be	My	Favorite	Theory	account.	And	fifthly,	as	one	author	has	just	noticed	there	is	an	additional	problem	 related	 with	 risk	 attitudes	 of	 agents,	 who	 are	 normatively	uncertain.	 In	 many	 situations	 they	 could	 assign	 positive	 credence	 to	several	 theories	 with	 different	 attitudes	 toward	 risk.	 In	 this	 kind	 of	cases	 the	 intertheoretical	 comparisons	 of	 moral	 value	 would	 be	meaningless	 in	 the	 same	way	 that	 sentences	 like	 ’thunders	 are	 louder	than	honey	is	sweet’	are	meaningless.	(Nissan,	2015,	p.	358).	
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